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Abstract 
The focus of this work is on second chambers of parliament: their composition, functions, 
powers and effectiveness, and their reform. The work is comparative and considers different 
second chamber models within a context of the planned reform of the UK's House of Lords. 
The research began in 1998, with a project that sought to draw lessons for House of Lords 
reform from seven other second chambers: in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy and Spain. These represent a mix of second chamber models (directly elected, indirectly 
elected, appointed, and of varying powers) in advanced democracies of both federal and 
unitary structure. Extensive desk research was carried out, coupled with study visits where 
interviews were completed with academics, current and ex-parliamentarians, parliamentary 
staff and other practitioners. 
The main output of this project was a book published by Oxford University Press 
(publication 1). This is organised in three parts, amounting to around 120,000 words. Part 1 
sets the context, looking at the House of Lords and the history and practice of bicameralism. 
The second, and longest, part analyses the seven overseas institutions thematically, covering 
issues such as history, composition, legislative work, relations with government, 
constitutional roles, public perceptions and calls for reform. The third part draws out general 
lessons and considers conclusions for the composition and functions of a reformed House of 
Lords. It is the only modem book which analyses second chambers in this thematic and 
comparative way. 
The early results of the research (including publication 2) fed directly into the public debate 
on House of Lord reform during the time that the Royal Commission on Reform of the 
House of Lords was sitting in 1999-2000. After the Royal Commission reported, the work 
developed, including pieces which analysed their conclusions and recommendations in a 
comparative context (publications 3, 4 and 5). 
The analysis developed through the later publications to draw more generic conclusions 
dbout modem second chambers. In publication 6 I set out to answer the fundamental 
question 'what are second chambers for?' by looking at classically defined functions, 
actuality, and what contributes to effectiveness. In publication 7 I examined the extent to 
which second chambers fuIfiI one of their classic functions - of representing territorial units 
:vithin the state - and which factors contribute to their success. In publication 8 I consider 
vhy, when second chambers are so often criticised, they remain so little reformed. Finally, 
i>ublication 9 looked at some of the most recent developments in House of Lords reform in 
he light of overseas lessons. It asked whether - despite concerns about reform having been 
frustrated - the most important reform might prove to be the removal of the hereditary peers 
in 1999, which had already taken place. 
This PhD submission comprises the nine publications (summarised in the appendix) and a 
~overing context statement, which explains how they fit together, what are their main 
conclusions, and what original contribution is provided by the publications taken together. It 
"aims that the work represents a Significant contribution to the theory of bicameralism and 
the role of second chambers in modem democracies. The conclusions of the work include 
new points about the role of political parties in second chambers, the influence of such 
chambers' particular relations with executives, and the importance of perceived legitimacy to 
second chamber powers. After summarising these findings the context statement concludes 
l'\"ummarising the methodology employed, by examining some of the limitations of the 
, 'c'., k, and proposing some ideas for future research. 
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Introduction 
This document provides a context for the nine publications that make up the bulk of the PhD 
submission. The context statement sets out to explain the purpose of the work, its key 
findings, and how the individual works relate to each other. It also aims to demonstrate how 
the collected works are equivalent to a PhD by the conventional thesis route. 
The document begins by outlining the research question which the work was setting out to 
answer. It also briefly reviews both the policy context, in terms of parliamentary reform 
debates in the UK, and then the theoretical context contained in the current academic 
literature. The longest section of the document describes the key research findings, relating 
these back to the practical and theoretical context, and stating which publications in 
particular address each of the key points. I then summarise the impact of the work, both in 
terms of the academic literature and the UK reform debate. The closing sections review the 
methodology employed, the limitations of the research, and my personal development as a 
researcher during the five years in which the work was carried out. 
The Research Question 
The starting point for this research was the stated ambition of the 1997 Labour government to 
succeed where other governments throughout the 20th century had failed, by reforming the 
House of Lords to create a modern second chamber. The Labour Party's 1997 election 
manifesto stated: 
The House of Lords must be reformed. As an initial, self-contained reform, not 
dependent on further reform in the future, the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote 
in the House of Lords will be ended by statute. This will be the first stage in a process of 
reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative. The legislative 
powers of the House of Lords will remain unaltered. 
The system of appointment of life peers to the House of Lords will be reviewed. Our 
objective will be to ensure that over time party appointees as life peers more accurately 
reflect the proportion of votes cast at the previous general election. We are committed to 
maintaining an independent crossbench presence of life peers. No one political party 
should seek a majority in the House of Lords. 
A committee of both Houses of Parliament will be appointed to undertake a wide-
ranging review of possible further change and then to bring forward proposals for 
reform. 
The programme of research began with a major study, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, to 
draw lessons from bicameral parliaments overseas for the reform of the House of Lords. The 
project was conceived and carried out at the Constitution Unit, a research centre at 
University College London with a focus on practical reform. I The work began in July 1998, 
before any action had yet been announced with respect to implementing the government's 
manifesto commitment. 
The initial research question was thus what form of second chamber would be most 
appropriate for modern Britain. This is a many-faceted question. In considering potential 
second chamber forms one must consider the various powers and functions which such a 
chamber might adopt, as well as the various modes of composition which might be 
I For details of the Constitution Unit and its work see http://www.ucI.ac.uk/constitution-unit. 
2 
employed - themselves both questions with a multitude of potential answers. And there is a 
necessary interaction between the two, in that the chamber's composition will impact on its 
ability to carry out particular functions, and will also influence how powerful it is in practice. 
In addition there are many more secondary issues, for example relating to the administration 
of the chamber and the pay and conditions which its members should enjoy. 
In considering a. second chamber for modem Britain, it is also necessary to consider the 
characteristics of modem Britain, and how its needs might differ from those of the past. This 
is a pertinent question when considering reform of a parliamentary chamber dating back at 
least 700 years (albeit having been subjected to various piecemeal reforms). But this aspect is 
made significantly more complex by the major programme of constitutional reform 
embarked upon by the 1997 government and still in its early stages when the research began. 
Probably most important was the devolution of power in Scotland and Wales (for which 
legislation was passed in 1998, with the Parliament and Assembly established in May 1999) 
and the promise of further such developments in England. This was set to change the 
territoIjal politics of the UK, as well as the powers of the Westminster parliament. Other 
significant issues included the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the proposals (as 
yet still unrealised) to hold a referendum on the electoral system for the House of Commons. 
All these reforms had a potentially important impact on the appropriate role for the House of 
Lords. 
The changing constitutional context, as well as the complexity of the options for the form of 
the second chamber itself, made this research question an ideal candidate for comparative 
study. Not only could other Western democracies offer examples of different models of 
second chambers; with detailed study they could also offer some indication of how different 
models fitted within diverse constitutional contexts, themselves reflecting the different 
directions in which Britain might develop. As with all comparative work, such a study also 
offered the chance to gain a more objective perspective on the current form of the House of 
Lords. As Dogan and Pelassy suggest, comparative work allows us to 'reconsider accepted 
generalisations', demonstrating which features are unusual and which are widely shared: 
'the observer who studies just one country could interpret as normal what in fact appears to 
the comparativist as abnormal', or indeed vice versa (1990: 6, 8). Developing a more objective 
perspective might point the way to future reforms, as well as shedding light on how some of 
the House of Lords' more valued features could be retained. 
The research started some six months before the publication of the House of Lords Bill, 
which sought to implement 'stage one' reform by removing the rights of hereditary peers to 
sit in the chamber. At the same time the government published a White Paper (Cabinet 
Office 1999), setting out its longer term intentions and announcing the creation of a Royal 
Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords - charged with considering the 
appropriate way forward for 'stage two'. The Royal Commission sat from early 1999 and 
thus pursued the central research question in parallel with this work. In doing so it drew 
upon some of the early results of this research. Its report (Royal Commission 2000) was 
published in January 2000, just a week after the book which forms the most significant 
publication within this package. 
The eviction of the hereditaries was largely achieved with the passage of the Bill in 
November 1999.1 In terms of the debate on the second stage of reform, the Royal 
Commission's report proved to be only the beginning. The report was generally not well 
2 The government accepted an amendment to the House of Lords Bill which allowed 92 hereditary 
peers (out of the total 746) to remain in the chamber, pending further reform. This is discussed in 
publications 1 and 5. 
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received. Amongst its more controversial recommendations was the proposal that the 
composition of the chamber would continue to be largely appointed, with a relatively small 
number of elected members. Debate continued, with the political parties and other groups 
setting out their response to the Royal Commission report. The Labour Party's manifesto for 
the 2001 election restated its commitment to completing reform and to achieving a 'more 
representative and democratic' upper house. After the election the government issued a 
second White Paper (Lord Chancellor's Department 2001), for public consultation. There 
were around 1,000 responses, including a detailed report from a House of Commons Select 
Committee (PASC 2002). After this a joint parliamentary committee was established to 
consider the way forward, and issued an options report OCHLR 2002), which was voted on 
in both Houses of Parliament in February 2003.3 
The question of the future of the UK's second chamber has thus had a thorough airing 
during the period in which this research was carried out, and at various points the 
publications included here have fed directly into that debate (see 'Impact of the Work', 
below): There remains no agreed answer to the central research question among the 
politicians, and beyond the removal of the majority of hereditary peers, little further reform 
has yet been achieved. As discussed in the section that follows, the UK started the period 
with a second chamber that conformed to a model long abandoned in most other advanced 
democracies. The hereditary model having finally been discarded, the debate moved rapidly 
to demands for an elected second chamber that reflected more closely the model adopted in 
most comparable democracies. However, such a quantum leap would not be consistent with 
the gradualist approach to constitutional reform traditionally taken in the UK. It is thus 
perhaps not surprising that it has, so far, failed to be realised. 
Although initially and primarily focussed on the dilemma for the UK, the work also went on 
to address the broader research question of the appropriate role for a second chamber in a 
modem parliamentary democracy. There is a relatively limited literature on this question, 
given its significance. This literature (discussed in the two sections below) provided a 
starting point for the work on the UK and has also to some extent been augmented by it. 
More specifically my work has sought to answer generic questions about, for example, the 
potential territorial role of a modern second chamber, and the obstacles to second chamber 
reform. But even where generic questions are addressed by the work, this is informed very 
much by a UK perspective, thus distinguishing it from much other comparative work on 
such questions. 
The Rationale for Bicameralism 
There is surprisingly little written about modern rationales for bicameralism. In one of the 
few book-length studies of second chambers (albeit an edited collection), Patterson and 
Mughan suggest that 'It is a tribute to the hidden power of tradition and inertia in the 
governing affairs of human beings that fundamentals of institutional design are rarely laid 
open to full appraisal. Institutions tend to be accepted at face value. Whether the legislature 
has one house or two is taken for granted by practitioners, observers, and citizens' (1999: 8). 
On the relatively rare occasions where the rationale for bicameralism is discussed, this 
generally starts with an account of historical views, and often goes no further. As many of 
the traditional arguments still apply, and because - especially with respect to Britain -
historical developments provide an important context, I too will begin here. However, in this 
3 For a fuller account of these developments see Norton (2003). For a discussion of the outcome of the 
votes see Maclean, Spirling and Russell (2003). 
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and the next section I also expand to include a summary of modern accounts, insofar as these 
exist. 
More than any other second chamber, the House of Lords serves as a reminder of the original 
conception of bicameralism. Although significantly changed from its original composition 
(most notably by the Life Peerages Act 1958, and to a lesser extent the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Act 1876 and Peerages Act 1963) the presence of hereditary peers and bishops in the chamber 
can be traced back to the very origins of the English parliament, many hundreds of years 
ago. 
The earliest examples of multi-chamber arrangements can be traced to the ancient world. The 
body that gave its name to most second chambers existent today is the Roman Senate. The 
Roman system of government combined monarchy (the Consuls), aristocracy and oligarchy 
(the Senate) and popular government (the Tribunes and the Plebian Council) - with the 
Senate being in practice the main governing body (Lakoff 1996). This type of 'mixed 
govempleIlt', with different interest groups represented, was contrasted by scholars with the 
system of pure democracy, as practised in ancient Athens, and about whose potential 
instability and innate dangers many were concerned. Plato, for example, believed that rule 
by the people encouraged political leaders to pander to populism and that by treating all 
men as equal, democracy 'marginalises the wise' (Held 1996: 30). Aristotle likewise expressed 
concerns about such a system, believing that each pure form of government (rule by the one 
- monarchy, the few - aristocracy, or the many - polity) could develop into a corrupt form 
(tyranny, oligarchy or democracy respectively) where the ruling group sought to serve its 
own ends rather than the common good. He thus concluded that a system which mixed 
elements of oligarchy and democracy was, in creating balance between different interests, 
preferable to either pure form (1995 [c. 330 Be]). Consequently a republic came to be 
understood as a system of 'mixed or divided government combining monarchy, aristocracy 
and popular government', which was seen to result in more stable politics than rule by a 
single class (Lakoff 1996: 65). 
The development of bicameralism in England thus effectively saw adoption of an already 
familiar model of government. It was in the 13th century that knights and burgesses 
(representing shires and boroughs respectively) were added to the existing body of barons, 
earls and bishops that met in the English parliament to advise the king and agree taxation. 
These groups came to meet separately in a parliament that was still formally unicameral. The 
elite chamber, the House of Lords, was formally recognised as a separate body in the time of 
Henry vm (Haskins 1948). Drawing inspiration from Plato and Aristotle, English thinkers 
came to advocate the mixed model, a 'blending of the simple forms of government -
monarchy, aristocracy and democracy' (Weston 1965: 10). 
Later writers such as Machiavelli and Montesquieu also argued for this approach. 
Montesquieu modelled his ideal state on the English constitution, and supported the 
bicameral approach, stating that 'The legislative body being composed of two parts, one 
checks the other, by the mutual privilege of refusing. They are both checked by the executive 
power, as the executive is by the legislative' (1977 [1748]: 211). His explicit support for the 
elite model was influential both in reinforcing belief in England in the moderating and 
stabilising influence of the nobility in the House of Lords (on both the monarchy and the 
people), and in spreading such ideas overseas. He suggested that: 
In a state there are always persons distinguished by their birth, riches or honours, but 
were they confounded with the common people and to have only the weight of a single 
vote like the rest, the common liberty would be their slavery and they would have no 
interest in supporting it, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them. The 
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share they have therefore in the legislature ought to be proportioned to the other 
advantages they have in the-state, which happens only when they form a body that has a 
right to put a stop to the enterprises of the people, as the people have the right to oppose 
any encroachment of theirs (1977 [1748J: 205). 
In all of these analyses bicameralism was thus synonymous with mixed government and the 
need to represent different interests, with one interest group being able to check the other 
and prevent those in government from serving only their own ends. This was of particular 
relevance in protecting the interests of the educated and/or wealthy minority, in the face of 
pressures towards democracy. These different interests were each assured representation 
through their own separate chamber. In its elite representation the House of Lords was 
joined over time by many other similar chambers throughout Europe, although little even of 
the vestiges these other chambers' original forms now remain. 
In the foundation of the American constitution in the later 18'" century similar concerns were 
expre~d but a new solution was devised. The framers of the federal constitution were 
easily drawn to support a bicameral legislature, given tradition first in Britain and then in the 
independent states. Bicameralism could also help deal with their concerns about unchecked 
majority rule. James Madison believed a second chamber was necessary because of 'the 
propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and 
violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious 
resolutions' (1987 [1788]: 366). Speaking at the convention at which the constitution was 
agreed he said that there were two purposes for a second chamber: 'first, to protect the 
people against their rulers, secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions 
into which they themselves might be led' (quoted in Patterson and Mughan 1999: 14). But 
whilst some delegates (including Hamilton) favoured a chamber on the elite model (Marriott 
1910), the answer arrived at also provided a solution to the difficult problem of balancing 
state and federal powers in the new constitution. This established a new model for second 
chamber composition, where each state was given an equal number of representatives, to be 
elected by the state legislature. Unlike the elite model this did not protect minority interests 
in a class sense, but did so in a territorial sense - meaning that the large states, dominant in 
the population-based House of Representatives, could not trample on the interests of small 
states. Federal legislation required the support of both chambers: thus representatives of half 
of the states, as well as representatives of half the population. 
This was not the only way in which territorial second chamber models developed. In some 
other federations, such as Germany, a popularly elected chamber was added to a territorial 
body that would ultimately become the second chamber (Tsebelis and Money 1997). But the 
US model was influential both in its territorial basis and its principle of equal state 
representation. In both cases these new territorial models effectively created an alternative 
form of 'mixed' government to that based on elite representation, offering many of the same 
benefits. 
In the nineteenth century De Tocqueville's concerns about the 'tyranny of the majority' 
reflected the familiar theme, and were taken up by John stuart Mill. His On Uberty 
emphasised the need to defend liberty not just against single oppressive rulers, or against 
ruling classes, but also against democracy (1998 [1859]). Mill declared himself against 
bicameralism, but nonetheless believed that 'A majority in a single assembly, when it has 
assumed a permanent character - when composed of the same persons habitually acting 
together, and always assured of victory in their own House - easily becomes despotic and 
overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred 
in by another constituted authority'. He also acknowledged the role that a second ~er 
can play: 'One of the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of politics, 
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especially in the management of free institutions, is conciliation: a readiness to compromise; 
a willingness to concede something to opponents, and to shape good measures so as to be as 
little offensive as possible to persons of opposite views; and of this salutary habit, the mutual 
give and take (as it has been called) between two Houses is a perpetual school' (1998 [1861J: 
385). These sentiments echoed those of earlier thinkers that bicameralism provided both an 
opportunity for second thought, and for building support for policy beyond the bare 
numerical majority. 
Modem expositions of the second chamber role draw out these same themes. Patterson and 
Mughan propose that the two broad functions of second chambers are 'representation' and 
'redundancy' (1999: 10-16). Money and Tsebelis (1992) propose a threefold justification of 
bicameralism, on the basis of representation of different interests, stability, and quality 
assurance. This seems consistent with Patterson and Mughan's analysis, as stability might 
reasonably be considered an outcome, dependent on the representation and redundancy 
functions. 
The 'representation' function depends on the composition of the second chamber being 
different to that of the first. This enables different and competing perspectives to be taken 
into account in the formation of policy. Arend Lijphart (1984, 1999) gives particular emphasis 
to the continued role of second chambers as a check on potentially tyrannous majorities 
(particularly in diverse societies) by making bicameralism one of the eight features of his 
'consensus' as opposed to 'majoritarian' democracy. As he puts it 
In plural societies ... majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than 
democracy. What these societies need is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus 
instead of opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the 
size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority: consensus 
democracy (1984: 23). 
In support of such systems he echoes the sentiments of Bernard Crick who, in his classic In 
Defence of Politics, suggested: 'The democratic doctrine of the sovereignty of the people 
threatens . . . the essential perception that all known advanced societies are inherently 
pluralistic and diverse, which is the seed and the root of politics' (2000: 62). 
As suggested, there have been two traditional institutional forms which have been used to 
achieve wider representation via the second chamber: the elite and the territorial models. In 
modem parliaments the elite model has largely fallen out of use, although some vestiges 
remain (beyond the House of Lords these include, for example, the higher property 
qualification for the Canadian Senate, and the appointed representatives of the 'great and the 
good' in the Italian and Indian Senates). As first chambers in modem states are directly 
elected on the basis of population (using varying electoral systems), the 'representative' 
function will only be fulfilled if the second chamber has some other basis of composition. To 
achieve this the territorial model - initially contrived to suit the needs of federal states but 
today also common in unitary states - has become dominant. The distinguishing features of 
this model are that members represent territorial units, such as provinces or states, which are 
the basis of some kind of sub-national administration; and that the smaller or less populous 
units are often over-represented. 
The term 'redundancy' refers to the duplication, or 'second thought' which is inherent in a 
bicameral arrangement. Legislation is looked at not once, but twice, which has potential 
advantages for 'quality control' (Tsebelis and Money 1997: 40). Patterson and Mughan (1999) 
suggest that there are two primary arguments for the redundancy function. First, that a 
revising role allows for the straightforward ironing out of errors and the introduction of 'a 
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second opinion' (Wheare 1967: 140), based upon the different perspective of the upper house. 
Second, that the process of delay introduced by a second round of legislative consideration 
allows issues to be aired more widely - in modem democracies, including through the media 
- and gives an opportunity for the public to reach a fixed view, thus avoiding hasty 
decisions. 
Finally, there have also been a series of recent considerations of the justification of 
bicameralism from a social choice perspective. These tend to be mechanistic and ahistoric in 
their approach, and have focussed in large part on the relative merits of bicameralism and 
supermajoritarianism as a means of checking a potentially tyrannous majority. Levmore 
(1992) and Riker (1992) have both supported bicameralism, for broadly similar reasons. One 
advantage they cite is that a bicameral system may reduce the dangers of voting cycles and 
the 'paradox of voting' whereby a series of majority supported options exist, but the most 
popular is not chosen due to the order in which votes are taken. By rerunning the decision in 
two different chambers with different agendas, this is less likely to occur. Second, in 
comparison to supermajoritarianism, bicameralism is not subject to the 'power of minority 
coalitions to block truly majoritarian and desirable legislation' (Levmore 1992: 157). By 
requiring policy to be passed by two different and parallel chambers, bicameralism 'allows 
for simple majority rule when politics is one-dimensional ... yet discourages decision when 
politics is two-dimensional' (Riker 1992: 101). Bicameralism also helps deal with the problem 
that the majority in the first chamber (particularly under a non-proportional voting system) 
may not correspond to a majority amongst the electorate. As Riker points out, 'in a 
unicameral system there is no test of whether or not an apparent (that is, parliamentary) 
majority is in fact a real (that is, electoral or society) majority', whereas with bicameralism 
'delay prevents parliamentary action until a societal majority exists.' (1992: 115). Hence 
bicameralism may not only protect minority interests, but sometimes majority interests as 
well. 
Not all such analyses come to the same conclusion, however. Mueller (1996) points out that 
there is in fact no guarantee that the second chamber does represent a different dimension of 
policy preferences (thus emphasising the importance for effective bicameralism of a distinct 
upper house membership). But further, he points out, there is no guarantee that there are 
only two such dimensions - on certain issues it might be necessary to have three, or four, 
chambers to represent all the dimensions of opinion. This is a shortcoming which Mueller 
concludes recommends supermajoritarianism, but which for others might simply illustrate 
the great challenge of effective bicameral design. 
With respect to the research question these analyses help provide some answers, but also 
open up new areas of enquiry. As Britain rejects the elite model in the case of the hereditary 
peers, what alternative model of representation would be appropriate? In a state undergoing 
a process of devolution, would the territorial model be more appropriate? How can the two 
chambers be sufficiently distinct, but both have a composition which can command respect? 
And with regard to the redundancy function, how much power should a second chamber 
have to impose delay? What is the relationship between these two major questions of 
composition and powers? 
Modern Theories of Bicameral Function 
The rationale for bicameralism provides an essential context. However, in considering 
potential forms for a reformed House of Lords, it is necessary to go much further. This work 
sought to investigate how different models of bicameralism function in practice, and what 
factors are associated with the success of different systems. The literature on this question is 
more limited still than that on the merits of bicameralism. 
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The most detailed analysis, albeit brief, is provided by Lijphart (1984, 1999). This is centred 
on a proposed classification of the 'strength' of bicameralism, and provided a starting point 
for my work. Lijphart's system is based on two principle variables. The first refers to whether 
the two chambers are 'symmetrical' or 'asymmetrical' in terms of their powers. Lijphart 
notes that few second chambers have formal powers fully equal to those of their respective 
first chambers, as reduced powers over legislation (eg. to delay rather than veto indefinitely) 
are common. He also notes that 'the actual political importance of second chambers depends 
not only on their formal powers but also on their method of selection' and that 'second 
chambers that are not directly elected lack the democratic legitimacy, and hence the real 
political influence, that popular election confers. Conversely, the direct election of a second 
chamber may compensate to some extent for its limited power' (1999: 206). In his 1984 work 
Lijphart proposes a threefold classification of 'symmetrical', 'moderately asymmetrical' and 
'extremely asymmetrical' bicameralism (the first two of which for practical purposes are 
treated together); in the 1999 version the classification is adapted to simply 'symmetrical' or 
'asymn:tetrical'. In order for a bicameral parliament to be in the first category the second 
chamber must possess some combination of strong formal powers and democratic 
legitimacy. 
The second variable on which Ujphart bases bicameral strength is 'congruence' or 
'incongruence' in terms of the composition of the two chambers, reflecting the traditional 
emphasis on chambers representing different interests. As he notes, 'second chambers may 
be elected by different methods or designed so as to represent different minorities. If this is 
the case, the two chambers differ in their composition and may be called incongruent' (1999: 
207). As examples he gives the House of Lords, where the nobility was (at time of writing) 
the over-represented minority, and the French Senate where small communes are over-
represented. But his primary focus is on the design of territorial chambers, where certain less 
populous states or regions may have disproportionate numbers of seats. 
The overall strength of a bicameral system is determined, in Lijphart's analysis, by a 
combination of these variables. In both editions he proposes three categories of strength: in 
1984 'strong', 'weak' and 'insignificant' bicameralism, which in 1999 are renamed 'strong', 
'medium-strength' and 'weak,.4 A system belongs in the first category if it is both 
symmetrical and incongruent (ie. the chambers have similar powers and differing 
memberships), to the second category if it possesses one of these attributes, and to the third 
category if it has neither. 
George Tsebelis, in his work on 'veto players' (1995,2002), has also given some consideration 
to the role of second chambers and introduces a variable not explicit in Lijphart's analysis. 
His aim is to devise a generic classification which allows comparison between political 
systems of varying formal structure - particularly between presidential and parliamentary 
systems - and to assess their degree of 'policy stability'. In doing so he parallels Lijphart's 
analysis to some extent, with a 'veto player' defined as 'an individual or collective actor 
whose agreement (by majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy' 
(1995: 300): thus including parliamentary chambers, presidents, and political parties in 
coalition governments. One might therefore expect that Lijphart's consensus democracies 
would be found to have high numbers of veto players in comparison to majoritarian ones. 
But the analysis . of Tsebelis is sensitive to modem realities, in that he gives primary 
importance to the partisan control of different veto players and asserts that where two 
4 In the change to his system of classification Lijphart acknowledges the arguments of Tsebelis and 
Money (1997) that all second chambers are likely to have some influence and that the term 
'insignificant' is thus overly dismissive. 
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players are controlled by the same political party one may be effectively 'absorbed' by the 
other. This results in changes in the effective numbers of veto players in a system over time, 
as partisan control changes. In order to qualify as a veto player a second chamber must thus 
have both a different partisan majority to the first chamber and government, and have a veto 
power. This is consistent with Lijphart's concentration on powers and distinct composition, 
but gives prominence to partisan control rather than institutional structure of the chamber. 
Although somewhat crude in potentially discounting the many systems where the second 
chamber does not have a veto power, this analysis also introduces the subtlety that a 
bicameral system may differ in strength over time as partisan control of the chambers 
changes. 
Sartori (1994) similarly cites two variables to be considered when classifying bicameral 
arrangements: equal or unequal powers and similar or dissimilar compOSition. With respect 
to the latter he makes dear that party balance will be crucial. Due to fears about gridlock he 
suggests that it is not desirable for a chamber to have both strong powers and dissimilar 
compo~ition to the first chamber. On the other hand if the composition of the two chambers 
is similar, the second is liable to add little. He therefore effectively rejects systems achieving 
either Ujphart's strongest or weakest classification, and appears to support only the middle 
option, where the two chambers are distinct, but the second does not have the absolute 
power to overturn the decisions of the first. 
Money and Tsebelis (1992) and Tsebelis and Money (1997) also ascribe more value to weaker 
second chambers than does either Ujphart or Tsebelis's veto player analysis. They suggest 
that there have traditionally been two proposed roles for bicameralism: 'political' /'strong' (a 
powerful blocking chamber, more often found in federal systems) or 'efficient' /'useful' (a 
weaker or more congruent chamber which fulfils a redundancy role, more often found in 
unitary states). They suggest that these two alternative roles have traditionally been seen as 
in conflict, but that a chamber without strong formal powers may in fact also be influential. 
Government and the first chamber may choose to compromise over policy rather than face 
the delay (albeit perhaps short) which would result from second chamber opposition. 
Key Research Findings 
This section seeks to outline the most Significant findings of the research. It does not seek to 
be an exhaustive listing of the issues covered: obviously it cannot be other than a very brief 
summary of what is contained in roughly 450 pages of published text. One of the practical 
functions performed by the publications was to pull together and make readily available 
some basic information about second chambers overseas. Another was to draw conclusions 
about particular chambers, or particular activities within chambers. Here I concentrate only 
on some of the more important general points. This is done with reference to the relevant 
literature and the prevailing political environment. 
The section is broken into two main subsections, relating to the two defining features of 
second chambers: their powers and their composition. The reform process is considered in a 
separate short subsection. The section doses with some conclusions, which pull together the 
main findings in summary form. 
The Power and Influence of the Chamber 
The most important findings of the research are probably those that can be grouped within 
the broad topic of second chambers' influence and powers. These findings both extend the 
theoretical debate and feed directly into the reform debate in the UK. Under this broad 
heading the key issues for consideration are the nature and importance of second chamber 
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legitimacy, the chamber's powers over the executive (and their effect), and the strength and 
influence of second chambers. 
The Legitimacy of Second Chambers 
Approaching the literature on bicameralism from a UK perspective, one of the striking 
feann:es is the extent to which discussion of second chamber legitimacy is overlooked or 
oversimplified. Within the UK debate over reform, the desirability of increasing the House of 
Lords' legitimacy - and by how much - is constantly under discussion. 
The lack of perceived legitimacy of the House of Lords has been one of the key factors 
preventing it being a powerful check on government. The hereditary basis of the upper 
house - target of reformers since before the 1911 Parliament Act -<reated an impediment to 
its making full use of its considerable formal powers. Where the upper house has sought to 
intervene in policy, government ministers and MPs have been quick to point out its shaky 
justification in challenging the decision of an elected House of Commons. This clearly had 
resonance with the public, 58% of whom in 1998 believed that the right of hereditary peers to 
sit and vote in the chamber should be ended.s 
The decline in perceptions of House of Lords legitimacy, and thus influence, had been a long 
one. Bagheot noted in the 1860s that the influence of the chamber was declining as a result of 
the Reform Act and the increased democratisation of the House of Commons. He suggested 
that 'As the picturesqueness, the featureliness of society diminishes, aristocracy loses the 
single instrument of its peculiar power' and that 'It is idle to expect a second chamber - a 
chamber of notables - ever to resist a popular chamber' (2001 [1867]: 73, 76). John Stuart Mill 
also noted the need for two chambers to be different in composition, and the dilemma that 
that would create for legitimacy: 'One being supposed democratic, the other will naturally be 
constituted with a view to its being some restraint upon the democracy. But its efficacy in 
this respect, wholly depends on the social support which it can command outside the House. 
An assembly which does not rest on the basis of some great power in the country, is 
ineffectual against one which does. An aristocratic House is only powerful in an aristocratic 
state of society.' (1998 [18611: 386). 
For a classification of parliamentary influence which makes explicit the need for public 
support, the best source is perhaps the classic book by Mezey (1979). This relates to 
parliaments generally rather than second chambers in particular.' Mezey provides a two-
dimensional classification to indicate the source of parliaments' effectiveness, where one 
dimension is 'support' - by both the public and elites. Mezey says that 'By "support" I mean 
a set of attitudes that look to the legislature as a valued and popular political institution' 
(1979: 27). His classification is as follows: 
Poli~ making power 
Strong 
Modest 
Little or none 








5 The Guardian, December 1998. Only around a quarter of the public opposed such a reform. 
• Indeed Mezey would not actually classify the House of Lords as a parliament, as his definition 
explicitly excludes legislative chambers which are not elected. 
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Such a classification enables us to explain the relative lack of influence of the hereditary 
House of Lords, for whilst its powers might be described as modest, for at least a century it 
would be hard to class it as 'a valued and popular political institution'. This resulted in its 
being of, at best, marginal effectiveness. 
As noted above, Lijphart (1984, 1999) takes some aCC01mt of legitimacy of second chambers in 
devising his classification of bicameral strength - although this factor is subsumed within the 
'symmetry' variable as a dimension of de facto powers. Sartori (1994) also notes the 
correlation between second chambers' legitimacy and powers, though only to observe that 
chambers which are not elected tend to have been given less formal power. Mastias and 
Grange (1987) give significant prominence to the concept of legitimacy, but likewise treat it 
as determined by whether or not a chamber is directly elected. In contrast to these 
approaches I have suggested that not only should legitimacy be explicit in the classification 
of second chambers' effectiveness, but also that this needs to reflect perceived legitimacy 
rather than some hard measure based purely on their mode of composition (there may be a 
strong correlation between direct election and perceived legitimacy, but the two do not 
amount to the same thing). In both of these respects my approach is closer to that of Mezey. 
Study not only of the House of Lords but also of overseas parliaments demonstrates the 
centrality of perceived legitimacy to the effectiveness of second chambers. This was first 
explored in publication 1, with the concept developed particularly in publications 5, 6 and 9. 
The Australian Senate offers an interesting example of how legitimacy is contested, and not a 
simple matter of whether a chamber is elected. Here the Senate is directly elected on a 
proportional basis, unlike the House of Representatives which uses the majoritarian 
'alternative vote'. The party balance in the Senate far more closely reflects the preferences of 
electors than does that in the lower house. Yet Senators were famously referred to by Prime 
Minister Keating as 'unrepresentative swill', and governments do their best to talk down the 
chamber's legitimacy. This is primarily on two bases; first, the fact that only half the Senate is 
renewed at each general election and hence its mandate can never be considered fresh?; 
second, the fact that all states have equal numbers of Senators and that the smaller states are 
significantly over-represented. In terms of Mezey's classification the support for the Senate 
from the elite is often uncertain, though its support from the public tends to be more reliable. 
This is discussed in particular in publication 5. 
The issue of legitimacy is a live one with respect to most of the chambers in the study. For 
example the French Senate is perceived as illegitimate by many, given its over-representation 
of rural areas, resulting in a politically conservative bias. The Irish Senate is likewise 
perceived as rather illegitimate due to its peculiar electoral system and inbuilt government 
majority. The German Bundesrat, meanwhile - although not directly elected - is considered a 
legitimate body at the heart of the federal system. Legitimacy is a particular issue for the 
Canadian Senate given its appointed basis and the calls over many years for its members to 
be elected. Yet all of these chambers will - like the House of Lords - tend to win public 
support for intervening in legislation where the particular policy line they are pursuing is 
popular. Despite government protestations, a 1996 poll in Australia even found a majority 
backed the Senate's position in blocking a policy that had been in the governing party's 
manifesto.' One of the contributions of this work is to bring together analyses of these diverse 
settings and demonstrate the centrality of the concept of legitimacy to the study of second 
. chambers. 
7 Except in the unusual event of a double dissolution, when the entire Senate is elected at once. 
8 See paper 5, page 38. 
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Thes~ observations raise the difficult question of what influences perceived legitimacy and 
how.it might be measured. This is a fertile area for future research. As Mezey says' Assessing 
the leve. of support for the legislature by looking at attitudes toward the institution leads us 
to ask and attempt to answer the question of why people support a legislature. One possible 
source of supportive attitudes is policy satisfaction' (1979: 29). The relative importance of 
legitimacy and perceived legitimacy, and the impact on both of these variables of policy 
satisfaction, representativeness and institutions' democratic credentials has been hotly 
contested in recent years (see for example Barnard 2001, Barker 1990, Beetham 1991). 
Not surprisingly given the historical context, legitimacy issues have been ever-present in the 
recent UK debates on reform, although not always explicitly. Margaret Jay when Leader of 
the House of Lords stated that the removal of the hereditary peers would make the chamber 
'more Iegitimate,.9 Such claims were seized on by the Conservatives in the House of Lords to 
justify a more interventionist attitude after stage 1 reform, with the Conservative Leader in 
the Lorpg declaring that certain conventions limiting the chamber's use of its powers should 
be considered dead. The Royal Commission expressed the desire to create a chamber with 
'the necessary political weight to carry out the responsibilities we propose it should have ... 
[so that] its decisions would be more widely seen as politically legitimate' (2000: 104). But the 
Commission also sought to protect the Commons' pre-eminence, and used this as a reason 
for not recommending a largely elected chamber. My work pointed out (publications 2 and 4) 
that in fact wholly or largely elected chambers are common overseas, and that the primacy of 
the lower house is generally ensured through limits on the chamber's formal powers rather 
than through attempting to limit its legitimacy. I suggested that on the basis of international 
experience it would be wise for a majority of second chamber members (rather than a 
minority as the Royal Commission proposed) to be elected, if the chamber's perceived 
legitimacy were to be secured. This was in part on the basis of polls suggesting that public 
opinion had moved rapidly on from rejecting the hereditary basis of the chamber to 
questioning the propriety of appointed members in a 2111 century legislature. 
The issue of legitimacy was revisited in the last of the publications (publication 9) after the 
House of Commons had rejected all the composition options put to it by the Joint Committee 
aCHLR 2002; Maclean, Spirling and Russell 2003). Here I returned to the argument that 
perceived legitimacy is not a simple matter of election or appointment, but is also linked to 
factors such as the party balance in the chamber (where the appointed Lords more closely 
reflects general election votes than the elected Commons), and the popularity of the issues on 
which the chamber chooses to tackle the government. I suggested that now government has 
effectively rejected elections for the chamber, the House of Lords may enhance its perceived 
legitimacy sufficiently, through tackling the government on the right issues, to make better 
use of its powers than it could in the past. 
Second Chamber Powers over the Executive 
Another issue that has received insufficient attention in the literature and is addressed in this 
work is the relationship between second chambers and executives. The general neglect of this 
point has led to some real-world misunderstandings in the House of Lords reform debate. 
Appreciating the centrality of the issue can both lead to a better understanding of second 
chamber culture and to a new way of viewing bicameralism itseH. This topic is pursued 
particularly in publications 1 (chapter 9) and 6, but also touched on in publications 4 and 5. 
• Her exact words were: 'I have no hesitation in asserting that the transitional Chamber will be more 
legitimate than that we have today'. House of Lords Hansard, 14 October 1998, Col. 925. 
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All recent commentaries on bicameralism focus to some degree on second chamber powers. 
Lijphart (1984, 1999) and Sartori (1994) make powers one of the two key features of their 
assessment of second chambers' effectiveness. Tsebelis (1995,2002) .and others treat systems 
as essentially unicameral unless the second chamber has an indefinite power of veto. Yet in 
their descriptions of the defining elements of second chambers none of these authors cite the 
difference between first and second chambers with respect to power over executives. All 
focus· instead on chambers' powers over legislation. Ujphart comes closest, by noting in 
passing that 'in parliamentary systems the cabinet may be responsible exclusively to the first 
chamber' (1984: 96). However the extent to which this feature is widespread, and its 
profound consequences, are not explored. 
The parliaments within this study demonstrate both the commonality of second chambers' 
special relationships with executives and the practical consequences that follow. Of the seven 
second chambers discussed in publication 1 only one - the Italian Senate - has the power to 
remove government from office through a confidence vote. As all of these systems are 
parlian;tentary, by definition government depends on the confidence of the legislature. Yet, 
Italy aside, this power over government is vested in the lower chamber alone. It is easy to see 
how this situation developed in Britain given the increasingly anachronistic composition of 
the House of Lords, and in other countries such as Canada where the second chamber is 
based on the elite model. It is also intuitively dear that it should apply where the original 
territorial model- based on forms of indirect election as in the US and Germany - was used. 
But this tradition has now been handed down to virtually all second chambers, including the 
wholly or largely directly elected, such as those in Australia, Spain and Japan, and has 
become a defining second chamber characteristic. 
The profound impact of this feature is illustrated by the case studies which form the core of 
the work. On the study trips, a common feature was for those familiar with the second 
chamber to cite how it was less partisan and had a more deliberative and independent ethos 
than the first chamber. These elements of second chamber culture are commonly attributed 
to other defining features that many such chambers share, such as smaller size, longer terms 
of office and more mature members.10 These factors are undoubtedly important, but in 
general the most important of all will be the second chamber's particular relationship with 
the executive. 
Such a result could reasonably be deduced from the wider literature on legislatures, making 
it particularly surprising that it does not feature in discussions of bicameralism. The different 
culture of legislatures in presidential and parliamentary systems is routinely noted in the 
literature on constitutional design - in particular the stricter party discipline in parliamentary 
chambers and the relatively more independent ethos of chambers in presidential systems is 
generally acknowledged. As Sartori says, 'Putting all in a nutshell, parliament-dependent 
government implies party-supported government; a support that in turn requires voting 
discipline along party lines' (1994: 193). By contrast Juan Linz notes that one of the 
characteristics of presidential systems is that 'parties are weak and lack discipline' (1994). 
The extent to which party discipline becomes pervasive under the parliamentary model is 
one of the main criticisms levelled against it (not least in the UK). The fear is that the iron 
discipline required by the risks of the confidence vote in effect hands control of parliament to 
the executive. As Olson suggests, 'ParadOxically, the very system intended to ensure 
parliament's control over the executive has led to exactly the opposite flow of control' (1994: 
77). 
10 All of these individual features are discussed in detail in chapter 2 of publication 1. 
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It is therefore natural that the lack of control a second chamber enjoys over government 
likewise encourages an independent ethos and less rigid party discipline. If government 
legislation is defeated in the first chamber this leads to serious questions about the stability of 
government itself. In certain instances a vote may be interpreted as a matter of confidence, or 
. even explicitly be made so by the government. The lack of this facility in most upper houses 
gives greater freedom to members representing parties of government to exercise a protest 
vote. Members of upper and lower houses may even collude over government defeats, with 
lower house members from governing parties relying on upper house colleagues to challenge 
policy in ways they cannot be seen to do themselves. 
The flip side of this executive-second chamber relationship also has important consequences. 
Where second chambers cannot remove executives from office this is generally reciprocated 
by the executive not being able to dissolve the second chamber (as it frequently can do with 
the first). In many cases the second chamber is in fact never dissolved as it is renewed in 
parts, either through appoinbnent (as in the UK or Canada) or staggered elections (Australia, 
France. Japan), or because the terms of regional delegates are linked to differing regional 
timetables (Germany, Austria, Spain). This creates a continuity of membership which is 
potentially important for the culture of the chamber, again strengthening its independent 
ethos. 
Thus in some ways, I have suggested, second chambers may enjoy relationships with 
executives closer to that of legislatures in presidential systems than to first chambers in 
parliamentary systems. Indeed, as in presidential systems, the lack of a confidence vote 
means that governments do not need to enjoy partisan majorities in second chambers as is 
the norm in first chambers. This is the case normally in Australia, since 1999 in the House of 
Lords, and from time to time in Canada and France depending which party is in 
government.1I As suggested in publication 6, bicameralism may thus be seen as a 
compromise offering some of the benefits of both a presidential and parliamentary system of 
government. If, as Sartori suggests, 'both presidentialism and parliamentarism breed within 
themselves the defects of their merits' (1994: 170), a halfway house between the two may be 
desirable.12 
The lack of understanding of this fundamental issue is clearly apparent in the recent House 
of Lords reform debate in the UK. In particular, I have suggested, it has led to fears that 
primacy of the House of Commons is threatened being overstated. The Royal Commission's 
terms of reference, for example, charged it with 'Having regard to the need to maintain the 
position of the House of Commons as the pre-eminent chamber of Parliament'. This resulted 
in the Commission concluding that 'increasing the powers of the second chamber over any 
particular category of legislation would be inconsistent with maintaining the position of the 
House of Commons as the pre-eminent chamber of Parliament' (2000: para. 5.7). This 
prevented the Royal Commission from proposing, for example, that the powers of the second 
chamber over constitutional Bills might be increased. I have consistently argued that this 
interpretation of primacy is too narrow and does not give sufficient prominence to the 
fundamental distinction between the two chambers (as well as to the House of Lords' limited 
powers over Bills) which will always leave the House of Commons dominant. In making 
such a point comparative examples are extremely useful, and there is some evidence that this 
understanding has filtered into more recent debates (see 'impact', below). 
11 The consequences of this feature are discussed further in the representation section below. 
12 SartOri (l994b) has declared himself in favour of a different kind of halfway house: the French semi-
presidential model. 
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Strength and Influence of Second Chambers 
A further conclusion, which some other works on bicameral systems acknowledge, but 
which is often overlooked, is the potential influence of even those chambers that would 
generally be ranked unimportant - because of either a relative lack of formal powers, a 
membership congruent to that of the lower house, or lack of democratic legitimacy. As 
indic~ted above, such chambers are largely set aside by Tsebelis (1995,2002), Sartori (1994) 
and Lijphart (1984, though less so in 1999) but assigned greater importance by Money and 
Tsebelis (1992) and Tsebelis and Money (1997). The case studies pursued in publication 1 -
notably France, Ireland and Spain, and experience in the UK, reinforce the arguments of 
those who claim that a chamber which might be classified as 'weak' or even 'insignificant' 
(Lijphart 1984) can nonetheless at times be influential. 
It is, of course, difficult to measure the power of a legislature. There is a temptation to focus 
on the more visible aspects of a chamber's influence, such as defeats of government Bills or 
numbers of amendments. But as Mezey emphasises (1979), legislatures may be exercising 
their powers, even if no vetoes are used or amendments passed, since government will 
respond to the anticipated view of the legislature, and particularly to its own backbenchers. 
The pressure that results in policy change will not necessarily be that applied publicly on the 
floor of the chamber or in committee but will often be that behind the scenes. Blondel has 
suggested that 'intervention by the legislature takes the fonn of influence and participation; 
there is no clear dichotomy between decision and non-decision. A whole variety of points of 
penetration of the legislature exists in the political system' (1973: 15). Indeed, the anticipated 
response of the legislature may result in some policies never being publicly proposed at all. 
One of second chambers' informal powers is that of bringing public prominence to an issue 
simply by debating it, or by actively campaigning against it. Even the most (formally) 
powerless of the chambers in this study - the Irish Seanad - is said to have had a significant 
impact through a short delay to a Bill to amend the electoral s~tem, which was consequently 
subjected to greater public debate and ultimately defeated. I Similar stories apply in other 
comparator countries, and the withdrawal of the Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill from 
the British parliament in 2000 following House of Lords' opposition provides another 
example of the same phenomenon. It is of course impossible to say how many potential 
government schemes never see the light of day for fear of similar exposure during passage 
through an - albeit formally weak - upper house. Although this is not a new point, 
publication 1 adds to the literature by bringing together substantial evidence to support 
those scholars who claim that dismissal of second chambers without veto powers, or 
labelling such systems as tantamount to unicameral, is overly simplistic. 
Issues 0/ Representation and Composition 
The challenge for modem second chambers is to find distinct methods of representation to 
first chambers. Originally the distinct form of representation provided by second chambers 
was class based. However, as disCussed above, this fonn of representation has lost legitimacy 
and thus chambers based upon it have, to large extents, lost their effectiveness. 
In order for modem second chambers to be effective they need to be at once distinct in their 
composition, but also to command sufficient respect to operate effectively. Previous multi 
chamber arrangements (notably European class-based systems but also, for example, the 
race-based chambers of apartheid South Africa) used each different chamber to represent a 
different interest. Modem systems tend instead to emphasise the need for parliamentary 
13 See publication 1, page 152. 
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chambers to be internally representative of whole populations across lines such as class, race 
and gender. If this is the aim, it becomes a significant challenge for second chambers to be 
both distinct from first chambers and to command respect. Mastiasand Grange (1987) have 
suggested that modem second chambers must exhibit a 'competing legitimacy' to that of the 
lower house. This clearly presents a difficult problem for institutional design. As this work 
has pointed out, a large majority of second chambers now base their representation primarily 
on some method of election, although elective methods vary widely. 
In deciding the nature of our representative democracy, Judge suggests that we need to ask 
'how are "the people" to be conceived - as individuals; or as collectivities organised around, 
for instance, geographical constituencies, workplace, functional interests, or social class?' 
(1999: 12). All of these models have been tested with respect to second chambers. 
The 'Territorial' Model 
The dominant model for second chamber composition is now territorial. Representation 
takes various forms: directly elected (as in Australia or the US), indirectly elected (as in 
Germany, Austria or India) or appointed (as in Canada), with less populous areas often over-
represented. With no tradition of territorial representation in the House of Lords, but a 
rapidly developing territorial politics, the UK potentially had a lot to learn from such second 
chambers about the effectiveness of different models. This matter is addressed in publication 
1 (particularly chapters 10 and 14) and publication 7, and is also touched on in publications 3, 
4,5 and 6. 
The extent to which second chambers really playa territorial role is much disputed. With the 
exception of Germany the territorial chambers within the initial study (ie. in 
Australia, Canada, Spain and France) were all subject to criticism for not properly 
representing territorial interests. Instinctively it might be thought that the extent to which a 
chamber fulfils a territorial function will be linked to its method of composition, so that 
indirectly elected representatives chosen by members of regional bodies would be more 
closely bound to regional politics than those directly elected by the people. However, 
evidence from the limited number of indirectly elected bodies included in the study did not 
appear to bear this hypothesis out. The German Bundesrat is a special case, with members 
necessarily representing a territorial interest as they are all members of state governments 
(and in practice are largely represented by substitutes who are state civil servants). But the 
indirectly elected members of the Spanish Senado did not appear to be any more closely 
linked to territorial politics than, for example, the directly elected members of the Australian 
Senate. In practice, this work suggested, the territorial link is likely to be created through 
building in territorial functions and formal reporting mechanisms, rather than through 
simple composition formulas. 
The work did also suggest, however, that the territorial role may be more subtle than is often 
supposed. For example in Australia it was reported that Senators do represent territorial 
interests, but will tend to do this within the privacy of party caucus meetings rather than 
openly on the floor. In addition, whilst not formally linked to state bodies Senators will be 
well networked inside the state party and are thus likely to bring state concerns to the 
negotiating table. Proportional representation for the Senate ensures that both main parties 
have parliamentary representatives within each state, reducing the risk that either party will 
adopt a policy strongly disadvantageous to one state in particular. Territorial roles within a 
modem party-dominated chamber may thus be less visible, but nonetheless influential. 
In the UK, Lords reform offers an opportunity to reflect within Westminster the new 
territorial politics promoted by devolution. The Royal Commission took up this challenge to 
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some extent, with their proposal that the minority group of elected members in a reformed 
chamber should represent the nations and regions, and that appointed members should be 
regionally balanced. In this work (particularly publication 4) I have suggested that this 
approach was too cautious, and particularly that if the majority of representatives for a 
region were appointed by the centre this would be unlikely to satisfy regional demands. For 
an example of such problems it is necessary to look no further than the much maligned 
Canadian Senate. 
Towards the 'Party' Model 
This research has suggested that many previous scholars have tended to understate the 
pervasive influence of party politics in second chambers, which in modem democracies is 
essential to understanding their dynamics. 
It has long been recognised that in Western democracies, parliaments have become the 
preserve of political parties. Early in the twentieth century Max Weber observed how 'the 
mass franchise fundamentally alters the dynamics of political life, placing the party at the 
centre of political business' (Held 1996: 169). In Britain these developments have led to a 
widely accepted belief that we have now moved from a system of 'parliamentary 
government' to a system of 'party government' Oudge 1999: 18). 
I suggest, therefore, that party balance will in most cases now be the most important 
determinant of how two chambers in a bicameral system interact. Where two chambers share 
a similar party balance they are more likely to be able to reach agreement than where they 
have conflicting partisan majorities. Throughout the work I have emphasised that today a 
difference in party balance between the two chambers is likely to be the most important 
element of 'incongruency'. 
This issue was explored in detail in publication 1. Chapter 4 set out the implications of the 
chamber's composition mechanism for its party balance. Chapter 6 presented evidence about 
the legislative impact of the chamber and concluded that this is largely driven by its partisan 
control. This is even the case in Germany's powerful federal Bundesrat, where coalition 
governments at state level make party composition more than a simple numbers game, but 
where negotiation by federal government becomes significantly more difficult as its party's 
influence at state level declines. I have suggested that second chambers controlled by 
governing parties will tend to 'collude' in the passage of legislation, whilst those controlled 
by the opposition will tend to behave in oppositionalist ways, and threaten gridlock. The 
chambers with the greatest real influence are likely to be those controlled by neither 
government nor opposition, where genuine negotiation over policy may take place. 
On this point my analysis differs from that of Lijphart, whose 'congruency' between the 
chambers is based first and foremost on their institutional structure. For example, Lijphart 
(1984, 1999) classifies the Australian Senate as 'incongruent' on the basis of equal 
representation of each state rather than - as I would suggest - on account of its lack of a 
government majority resulting from the use of a PR electoral system. Giving greater 
prominence to the importance of party balance - as does Sartori (1994) and particularly 
Tsebelis (1995, 2002) - also allows a classification of bicameral strength to reflect the modem 
reality that a second chamber's de facto power may fluctuate over time as the party in control 
of either chamber changes. The importance of this is illustrated by the way that the French 
5enat and British House of Lords have traditionally presented more of a threat to 
ggvernments of the left, and the Canadian Senate has bared its teeth on the rare occasions 
when its party balance falls out of synch with that of its House of Commons. 
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My research therefore suggests that we may be moving to a third phase of bicameral design -
from the 'elite' model through the 'territorial' model to the 'party' model, where the most 
important element when designing in distinct representation for an upper house is the 
implication for party political balance. Given what I have said above, this also leads to the 
conclusion - proposed in publications 6 and 9 - that second chambers are likely to add more 
in states that base their first chamber on a majoritarian electoral system, particularly if the 
second chamber introduces a more proportional chamber with no overall party control. As 
with presidential and parliamentary models, bicameralism may once again offer an 
opportunity for compromise between competing approaches to constitutional design, 
including elements of both the majoritarian and consensus approach. 
In recognition of the centrality of parties, there is now a literature on 'divided government' 
into which studies of bicameralism in such situations can be located. According to Elgie, 
'divided government refers to the absence of simultaneous same-party majorities in the 
executive and legislative branches of government' (2001: 2). This approach, like the veto 
player .analysis of Tsebelis (1995, 2002) potentially allows comparisons to be made across the 
divide between parliamentary and presidential systems, and to include both bicameral and 
unicameral legislatures. However, once again the subtleties of bicameral government can be 
overlooked. Elgie goes on to suggest that 'in the case of parliamentary regimes [divided 
government] corresponds to minority governments' (2001: 5). Only in a footnote does he 
acknowledge that it can also apply in bicameral systems where government doesn't control 
the upper house. John Uhr (1999) has applied the concept of divided government to 
Australian bicameralism, where government will frequently have large majorities in the 
lower house but no majority in the Senate. I would suggest that - particularly given the lack 
of a confidence vote in upper houses - there is a significant difference between divided 
government resulting from a lack of majority in the lower or in the upper house. The latter 
offers a more gentle - and potentially more stable - alternative. This topic seems worthy of 
further study. 
Other Forms of Representation 
Having said that political party representation is the reality in modem parliaments, and that 
this has therefore become central to the design of second chambers, there are of course those 
that express concerns about this approach. Signs of party 'dealignment' and falls in electoral 
turnoutl4 lead some to propose different forms of representation. If the first chamber is 
dominated by political parties, they suggest the second chamber should complement this, 
with members instead representing a different dimension of interests apart from the parties: 
social, economic, vocational or other interest groups (eg. Sinclair 1999). The belief in such 
'corporate' forms of representation can be traced back at least a century Oudge 1999) and was 
attempted in some countries in Europe in the 19305, largely under dictatorial one party 
regimes. 
The one second chamber to retain such a representational basis is the Irish Seanad, which 
was one of the subjects of this study. This uses a very impure corporate system, given that 
the electors are councillors and MPs, themselves necessarily partisan. Consequently 
candidates for Seanad elections are mostly aligned to political parties, and those that are not 
do not go on to be elected. Although nominated by interest groups, once in the chamber 
Senators form party groups and vote along party lines, with their official representative roles 
almost entirely invisible . 
.. For an overview of the literature in these areas and review of international trends see Norris (2002) 
and Dalton and Wattenberg (2000). 
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The Seanad, whilst being the only working example, thus offers a poor model from which to 
learn how a true corporate chamber might function. Proponents of this fonn of 
representation would argue that the design of the Seanad was misconceived and would 
certainly not be repeated. Whilst this is true, I have argued that there are two important 
lessons that can be learnt from the Irish case. First, in modem elections - even if organised on 
a wholly different representational basis - political parties are likely to pervade. Although 
nominations for the Seanad are made by Royal Societies and professional organisations, 
political party candidates still win these nominations. Second, although the Irish system is 
semi-vocational, few in Ireland have suggested reforming it to make its vocationalism 
effective - instead reformers tend to focus on moving to a more commonplace fonn of 
territorial representation. The general view is thus that the reality of political party rule 
needs to be accepted, and indeed that reforming the current system might lead to weakening 
of the nominating bodies through greater infiltration by political party interests. IS 
The Royal Commission rejected suggestions of any kind of formal corporate membership for 
a refoqned House of Lords. However, they did propose that the appointments commission 
be required to balance membership in a number of dimensions (gender, ethnicity, region and 
area of expertise, as well as party) in order to better reflect society. The Commission's 
aspiration was that the reformed second chamber should be more representative in a 
'descriptive' (Pitkin 1967) or 'microcosmic' Oudge 1999) sense than the House of Commons. 
They further concluded that this representativeness would best be achieved without 
elections, which would be likely to be dominated by the political parties. This approach 
raises interesting questions about perceived legitimacy, which the Royal Commission could 
not satisfactorily resolve. On the one hand there is a potential threat to the perceived 
legitimacy of the chamber if most of its members are appointed. The Commission argued 
against an elected house in part because it would acquire a new strength with respect to the 
House of Commons, thus acknowledging this link. However the Commission argued in 
parallel that an appointed chamber that was representative in a microcosmic sense would 
achieve greater legitimacy in modem Britain than one dominated by the political parties. 
Given that this is an institutional design without comparator, the Commission's thesis will 
remain untested unless such reform is carried out. 
The Reform Process 
A final topiC where this research makes a contribution fits neither within the topiC of powers 
nor composition of second chambers, but relates to attitudes to the reform of these 
institutions and the determinants of whether such reform takes place. These questions, 
addressed in publication 1 (primarily chapter 11) and publication 8, are of immediate interest 
in the UK. 
Mughan and Patterson have suggested that second chambers are 'essentially contested 
institutions' (1999: 338). It is in second chambers' very nature that this should be the case, 
given that the first chamber (at least in theory) represents the popular will, and the second 
chamber exists in large part to delay and question its actions. In addition, given the generally 
accepted legitimacy of first chambers' composition, second chambers based on a different 
representation principle are liable to be controversial. Yet second chambers which mirror the 
first chamber in their composition and attitudes will be of limited impact. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many second chambers are subject to calls for reform. 
Publication 8, in particular, considered why such reform is successful so rarely, concluding 
that there are a number of institutional and political factors. In countries where the second 
I~ See publication 1 chapters 3 and 11. 
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chamber is accused of weakness or illegitimacy perhaps the most important factor is the 
reluctance of government to encourage reform that might make agreement of its policies 
more difficult. We have seen this tension played out in recent U1< debates. Publication 8 
concluded that the outlook for reform was brighter in Britain than in many other states and 
that - in particular - the present moment provided a good opportunity. Publication 1 may 
however prove to have been more realistic, concluding that further major reform in the UK 
was, on balance, probably unlikely. 
Conclusions: The Second Chamber Role in a Modem Parlio.mentary Democracy 
In publication 6 I proposed four main roles for second chambers in modem democracies. 
Two of these were those proposed by Patterson and Mughan (1999): representation (of a 
different kind to that offered by the first chamber) and redundancy (allOwing for duplication, 
delay and second thought). The other two were the performance of distinct parliamentary 
duties not adequately performed by the first chamber, and, in parliamentary systems, 
bringing independence (in terms of providing a chamber more free of the executive). 
The first of these two additional roles has not been dwelt upon here. It is intended to 
illustrate the fact that second chambers do not simply offer redundancy - ie. repetition of 
duties already performed - but may bring other roles to parliament which would otherwise 
be neglected. This is frequently the case with respect to investigative committees, and the 
treatment of controversial issues which members of the first chamber may be nervous of 
approaching. But there can be other areas of specialism, complementing the specialisms of 
first chambers. For example whilst first chamber members may be constrained by the 
burdens of constituency work second chamber members frequently are not. This allows them 
to develop other parliamentary roles. 
The independence role is more profound. It stems in part from the particular relationship to 
the executive (discussed above) which has traditionally been given little prominence in 
analysis of bicameral systems. I have suggested that this is a crucial defining feature of 
second chambers, which can help create a different culture to that which exists in first 
chambers, with a less rigid approach to party discipline. Elements of second chamber 
composition can also help foster independence: for example long terms, rolling membership, 
higher age qualifications and even the explicit inclusion of members who do not take a party 
whip. Independence is thus a result of both the powers and composition of second chambers, 
and is certainly important enough to be considered a variable in its own right. 
In terms of the effectiveness of second chambers, I have proposed three factors which should 
be present for a chamber to be strong: 
• sufficient formal powers over legislation for the second chamber to make government 
and the first chamber think again; 
• a distinct composition to the first chamber: typically in terms of party balance, unless 
there is some other powerful representative basis that can override party interests; 
• sufficient perceived legitimacy for the chamber to realistically threaten to use the 
powers that it has. 
This classification differs in two important ways to that of Ujphart (1984, 1999). First, in the 
explicit prominence that it gives to legitimacy and also the definition of legitimacy as a 
subjective rather than objective variable: closer to the 'support' variable proposed by Mezey 
(1979). Second, in the importance given to partisan distinctiveness as opposed to 
distinctiveness resulting from, for example, over-representation of less populous areas. I 
have suggested that whether elite, territorial, or based on some other representative 
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principle, party balance in the second chamber is today likely to be the best determinant of 
its behaviour. 
A classification based on three variables will give a greater number of potential outcomes 
than one based on Lijphart's two. But, put crudely, it might be suggested that a second 
chamber was strong if it meets all three of the criteria, 'medium strength' if it meets two 
(with three types of medium strength, likely to differ qualitatively from each other), 'weak' if 
it meets only one (again with three types) and 'minimal' if it cannot meet any of the criteria at 
all. I would emphasise that even a second chamber that is 'weak' or 'minimal' may have 
something important to contribute, at least occasionally. 
This classification gives rather different outcomes to those proposed by Ujphart for some of 
the case study countries. We would agree that the German Bundesrat and Australian Senate 
are strong, but for slightly different reasons. We would also agree that Italy is 'medium', due 
to its formal powers and legitimacy but its inbuilt lack of distinctiveness; and that Ireland is 
'insignificant' or 'minimal' as it fails to meet any of the criteria. However, Ujphart proposes 
that the Spanish Senado is 'medium', when I would classify it as weak, due to its permanent 
government majority. He also classifies France and Canada as medium, when I would - like 
Tsebelis (1995, 2(02) - classify them differently depending on their party control. When they 
share a majority with the lower house they will be weak, but when they have a different 
partisan control they will be medium (or even strong, if they pick a popular issue). The 
recent change in composition to the House of Lords has moved it from a similar fluctuating 
position to a permanent place in the 'medium' category due to its lack of a majority for any 
party. It now enjoys relatively strong formal powers, and distinctiveness of the most 
important form. As I suggested in publication 9, careful manoeuvring to boost perceptions of 
its legitimacy may strengthen it further still. 
Finally, I have suggested that in three respects bicameralism offers a kind of haHway house 
between accepted models of government structure. In bringing a chamber more independent 
of the executive to a parliamentary system, it may offer some of the benefits associated with 
legislatures under presidentialism. In allowing a chamber without a government majority, 
without directly threatening the existence of that government, it can result in 'divided 
government', but of a softer variety than that where the government is under constant threat. 
And in bringing a proportional chamber to an otherwise majoritarian parliament, as in 
Australia (and latterly in the UK), it can offer some of the benefits of consensus politics 
balanced with many of the advantages of 'strong government'. These new roles for 
bicameralism in party-dominated parliaments have been insufficiently explored and merit 
further study. 
Impact of the work 
The impact of the work may be considered in two spheres: in terms of the academic debate 
and in terms of the reform debate that was live in the UK throughout the period covered by 
the submitted publications. 
The work's potential additions to academic theory have been outlined in some detail above. 
Further evidence of its impact can be demonstrated by its reception by leading scholars, 
particularly through published reviews of the book (publication 1). For example, Professor 
Philip Norton has referred to this as 'authoritative'.16 Nicholas Baldwin in the Journal of 
Legislative Studies concluded that 'Russell has written an analytical, practical, balanced book 
on a subject in which her depth of knowledge and understanding is apparent, as is her ability 
16 'Chambers of Secrets', House Magazine, January 27 2003: 22. 
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to convey that knowledge and understanding in an authoritative but highly readable 
manner,.17 Donald Shell in a review for Public Law concluded that the book 'does a necessary 
job well,18, whilst in Parliamentary Affairs Brian Thompson refers to it as a 'splendid 
comparative work on second chambers', measuring the Royal Commission's report against 
the 'benchmarks' it set downl9• In the Times Literary Supplement Professor Vernon Bogdanor 
reviewed the book alongside Patterson and Mughan's (in my view excellent) Senates, 
suggesting that its thematic comparative approach made it 'of much greater value'.20 
The comparative nature of the work means that it was also subject to comment by overseas 
scholars and reviews in overseas journals. The distinguished Italian Professor Gianfranco 
Pasquino described it as 'excellent,21. In the Australian Parliamentary Review Gareth Griffith 
suggested that 'the earlier chapters of her book have set a new standard of scholarship in this 
neglected area of study,22 and in the Australian Journal of Political Science Alan J. Ward 
concluded that 'the book is a unique piece of research that deserves a far wider readership 
than just the policy community in the United Kingdom'v. 
The rationale behind the original project was to influence the UK debate, and ensure that this 
was well informed about international practice. It is of course difficult to quantify the 
influence of the work in this respect. It was inevitable that discussion in the UK would call on 
information about overseas parliaments, but this work certainly made such discussion far 
easier by providing timely and relevant information in a form usable by policy-makers. It 
therefore helped create a situation whereby some elements of international practice have 
now become accepted as desirable when constructing a reformed second chamber for the 
UK. 
There were two direct links between this project and real-world politics. First, I was 
appointed as the primary consultant to the Royal Commission when the work was in its 
relatively early stages, demonstrating just how timely the conception of this project (by 
others at the Constitution Unit) had been. Five papers were commissioned about second 
chambers overseas.24 Second, in part as a result of the work, I was appointed as full-time 
Special Adviser to Robin Cook in June 2001. He, as Leader of the House of Commons, had 
responsibility for Lords reform within that chamber. There were also various less formal 
ways in which the results of this research have been fed into the policy world: through 
Constitution Unit briefings, articles and events (including a conference sponsored by the 
Royal Commission) and through joint work with other pressure groups, academics and 
politicians. 
Some basic second chamber features common from overseas, and highlighted in my work, 
have successfully fed through into policy proposals in the UK. For example, the Royal 
Commission (2000), House of Commons Public Administration Committee (P ASC 2002) and 
parliamentary Joint Committee OCHLR 2002) have all recommended that members of the 
17 Yolo 6 No.3, Autumn 2000: 126. 
18 Summer 2000: 200. 
19Yol.54No.1,}anuary2001: 172, 173. 
20 'Camera obscura', 4 February 2000: 13. 
21 'The Italian Senate', JOUT7Ull of Legislative Studies, vol. 8, no. 3, 2002, 67-78: 77. 
22 Yol. 16 No.2, Spring 2001: 197. 
2J Yol. 36 No.1, March 2001: 199. 
24 These works are not included within the current submission. They are listed in the bibliography to 
Royal Commission 2000. This can be found at www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/ 
cm45 I 4534/ 4534.htm. 
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upper house should serve for relatively long terms, and that the membership of the chamber 
should be renewed in parts. The Public Administration Committee, and MPs in debates, 
. have emphasised the need for the second chamber to be smaller than the House of 
Commons. The Royal Commission suggested that consideration be given to creating a joint 
committee to resolve disputes between the chambers (as exists in France and Germany).2S As 
debates have worn on it has increasingly been noted that second chambers in Western 
democracies are today largely based on election. 
On more profound issues which this work has sought to emphasise there have also been 
significant points of agreement. All three of the bodies mentioned above have recognised the 
importance of legitimacy (though given the historic problems with the House of Lords this is 
hardly surprising). All three, and all the main political parties, have emphasised the need for 
the two chambers to be distinct and said that no party should have a majority in the second 
chamber. All three have proposed that the powers of the House of Lords (which I have 
described as 'moderate in international terms') should remain largely unchanged. In the 
most rE:cent parliamentary debates on the issue Robin Cook repeatedly emphasised that the 
powers of the House of Commons would always be pre-eminent thanks to its exclusive 
power to sack the executive:l6, and stated that 'It is possible to keep a democratic second 
Chamber subordinate by law and convention; I do not believe that it is sustainable to keep a 
second Chamber subordinate by denying it legitimacy. That not only weakens the second 
Chamber, but undermines Par1iament'.27 
As with the academic literature there have also been a number of direct and positive 
references to the work in policy debates, including in the House of Commons28 and the 
House of Lords29. The Public Administration Committee report (2002: 6-7) quoted in full the 
three factors proposed to ensure second chamber strength from page 254 of the book, citing 
these as coming from 'an authoritative commentator'. In addition I have fed directly into the 
debate through the media, for example being interviewed for Newsnight, Channel 4 News 
and Radio Five Live when the Royal Commission's report was published, and publishing 
articles in The Guardian and The Scotsman.3O The book was also favourably mentioned by Peter 
Riddell in The Timell , Hugo Young in The Guardian3l and Joshua Rozenberg in The Lawyer». 
The Glasgow Herald featured it as 'book of the day' suggesting that 'The report of 
Wakeham's Royal Commission was boring and incomprehensible, missed many issues, and 
seems destined for the shelf. Ms Russell's thorough book goes straight to the heart of the 
hardest questions and gives a sober, efficient account of what is to be said on each side'.3C The 
BBC website still includes a feature-length article on second chambers overseas dating back 
to 1999 and quoting extensively from this work. 
2S This was the subject of one of the commissioned briefings, later published as Russell 1999. This issue 
is covered in chapter 6 of publication 1. 
26 For example House of Commons Hansard, 21 Jan 2003 : Column200; 4 Feb 2003: Column 160. 
Xl House of Commons Hansard, 21 Jan 2003 : Column20S. 
2B Norman Lamb MP, 10 Jan 2002 : Column 770. 
29 Lord Goodhart, 10 May 2000: Column 1643; The Earl of Listowel, 9 Jan 2002: Column 672; The Lord 
Bishop of Portsmouth, 10 Jan 2002: Column 714; Lord Hoyle, 21 Jan 2003: Column 670. 
30 'Life After Heredity', The Guardian,27 November 1998; 'A New Upper House to Represent the 
Nations and Regions?', ScotS11Uln, 19 January 2000; 'Chamber Musing', The Guardian, 19 January 2000. 
31 17 January 2000. 
32 20 January 2000. 
33 17 January 2000. 
34 24 February 2000. 
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Methodology 
The initial objective of the work was to make practical recommendations about the future 
directjon .of second chamber refonn in the UK. Given the relative paucity of detailed 
comparative information on second chambers - and the definite lack of such material framed 
from a UK perspective - a new comparative study seemed justified. In gathering fresh 
comp~rative information the potential existed for extending the theory, as well as drawing 
specific conclusions for application in the UK. 
In all research difficult choices must be taken about method and design. In comparative 
research the biggest dilemma is how many and which countries to study. There is a trade-off 
between breadth and depth: as Sartori has put it, whether one wants to know 'less about 
more' or 'better about less' (1994a: 24). Given the desire to draw detailed conclusions about 
many aspects of second chamber work, a 'small-n' or 'comparable cases' approach was taken, 
with seven countries included in the initial study (Dogan and Pelassy 1990; King, Keohane 
and Verba 1994; Landman 2000; Lijphart 1975). This approach precludes making universal 
generalisations, but sacrifices this in favour of 'depth and thickness of understanding' 
(Sartori 1994a: 24). 
The approach to the choice of countries combined elements of both the 'most similar 
systems' and 'most different systems' design (Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Landman 2000). As 
the specific objective was to draw lessons for the UK, rather than universal generalisations, 
all the comparators in the initial study were Western democracies with bicameral 
parliamentary systems. However, given the changing nature of the UK constitution a 
conscious decision was made to choose countries which reflected some of the different 
directions in which the UK might develop. Thus three of the comparators were federal 
(Canada, Australia and Germany) and four were unitary, with in the latter group Italy and 
Spain moving towards a more devolved arrangement. Four used a proportional electoral 
system for their lower house and three (Canada, Australia and France) a majoritarian one. 
Two were Commonwealth countries strongly influenced by the Westminster model and the 
remaining five were European. This mixed approach seems justified: as Dogan and Pelassy 
point out, no two countries are ever totally identical or totally different and whether 
countries studied are different or similar 'comparison will always be made at the point where 
the analogy cuts across the contrast' (1990: 144). 
'\ Another consideration in the choice of case studies was the desire to look at the operation of 
differently designed second chambers. In this respect the initial set of seven countries were 
also chosen to reflect diversity. One (Canada) had an appointed second chamber, three were 
wholly or largely directly elected (Australia, Italy and Spain), three were wholly or largely 
indirectly elected (Germany, Ireland, France). Three (Italy, Ireland, Spain) has a mixed 
composition. One (Ireland) bases representation primarily on a 'vocational' model. Their 
powers varied from complete veto (Australia, Canada) to a short delay (Ireland, Spain) over 
legislation. 
The research used two primary methods: literature search and elite interviews. In all but one 
case (Canada) a study visit was made. In preparation for each visit a thorough literature 
review was carried out, and this was supplemented later with other materials gathered 
during the trip. literature sources included parliamentary websites, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union database and publications, official parliamentary publications, books, book chapters 
and journal articles. At a minimal level written information was gathered about 20 bicameral 
systems, to construct the tables in chapter 2 of publication 1. But most desk research related 
to the seven case study countries and included background research on, for example, the 
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constitution, parliamentary and party system, as well as on the second chamber's history and 
current operation. 
The literature search created a starting point for the study trips, not only in terms of subject 
information but also by providing initial contacts, some of whom went on to become 
interview subjects or recommend other suitable subjects. In each country initial contact was 
made· with academics who had written on parliament or the second chamber, and 
simultaneously with the parliamentary authorities, and ideas and practical help were sought 
with setting up an interview programme. Interviews were organised generally with a mix of 
academic experts, parliamentary staff and members. Members primarily comprised Senators, 
but in some cases lower house members also. As far as possible efforts were made to balance 
the interviewees in terms of background and party representation and, for example, between 
defenders and critics of the institution. A total of 64 subjects were interviewed: a full list is 
given in the Acknowledgements section of publication 1. 
Before.the study visits began a template of target information was drawn up, with largely 
identical information sought on each country, as the comparable cases approach implies 
(Dogan and Pelassy 1990; King, Keohane and Verba 1994). This template later went on to 
provide the initial structure for Part II of publication 1. A list of standard questions was 
devised to which answers would be sought in each country, organised within broad 
headings, with particular country-specific questions arising from the literature review added 
to this. The interviews themselves were semi-structured, based around the template and pre-
prepared questions, but allowing the interviewee to introduce their own ideas and 
information (Fontana and Frey 2003; Svale 1996; Wengraf 2(01). Due to the shortness of time 
for the study visits and individual interviews this was only made possible by careful study of 
all available written information beforehand. Wherever elements of the template could be 
completed from written sources in advance, this was done. At the start of each trip the 
remaining questions were distributed between scripts for separate interviews, according to 
the expertise and perspective of the particular interviewees. Hence the semi-completed 
template provided the starting point, ensuring that I entered the interviews as well prepared 
as possible, as is essential in successful elite interviewing (Rossman and Ellis 2003; 
Zucherman 1972). The interviews were used to elicit a mixture of facts, examples and 
opinions. As far as possible views expressed by one interview subject were tested on later 
subjects, and corroboration was sought for information provided by interviewees where 
there was any degree of doubt. Information from interviews was written up as soon as 
possible by being added to the evolving template. 
Limitations and future research 
Although this was a successful programme of research, it inevitably had its limitations. There 
remains much work that could be done in this area to continue to close the gaps left open 
after this study. 
By conscious deSign, all of the countries studied were Westem parliamentary democracies, 
and the sample size was small. Any conclusions drawn from this sample therefore do not 
necessarily have universal application. The research has generated a number of hypotheses 
which appear to have firm foundation. It therefore provides a good starting point for further 
study, both amongst bicameral parliamentary democracies and more widely in the bicameral 
world. 
The research was at times limited by the extent of written material available, and the degree 
of access given to the various parliaments. Clearly some parliaments are better documented 
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than others, and second chambers will tend to be less well documented than first chambers. 
The Irish parliament, in particular, collects little data and is relatively under studied -
however, the project benefited from the prior work of John Coakley and Michael Laver for 
the recent constitutional review. Language barriers were perhaps greatest in France, where 
the culture of parliament is also not particularly open - however, there is a relatively good 
literature and the project benefited from the co-operation of Jean Mastias. In other countries 
difficulties were more limited, although in all cases the time was short to locate and absorb 
the literature and make contacts. 
The initial project was also limited by time constraints. The research began in summer 1998 
and there were only nine months in which to complete the study trips. To deal with this a 
decision was taken early on not to visit Canada, as the combination of a large literature, no 
language differences and a time difference allowing daytime telephone calls made this the 
easiest country to research from the UK (I was also fortunate to meet with a delegation of 
Canadian Senators in London). However, the time for the remaining six trips was still short -
in an ideal world one would have retained the option to extend or even repeat one or two of 
the trips. But in the event the outcome was good. The book was likewise written to a tight 
timescale (with the manuscript completed in four months), as we were keen for it to be 
published before the Royal Commission's report. Given more time the book might have been 
both shorter and more analytical. However, as the above reviews acknowledge, the product 
was good, and the later publications allowed space for my thoughts to develop. 
Given more resources the research would have benefited from inclusion of one or two other 
indirectly elected chambers representing regional interests. Only the unique German 
Bundesrat was included in the initial seven cases, alongside the minority of indirectly elected 
members in the Spanish Senado. Indirectly elected chambers representing territorial interests 
are relatively common and so were under-represented. Though interest in this model in the 
UK has been slow to take off, the progress on devolution in England means that it is likely to 
grow. Future work examining the work of second chambers in, for example, Austria, India, 
the Netherlands, Russia or South Africa would be valuable, particularly as there is virtually 
no comparative literature on this subject. 
It would also be very interesting to extend this study in other directions. It was designed as a 
study of parliamentary systems in Western democracies. It would be worthwhile to 
investigate to what extent the results can be generalised to newer or less developed 
democracies (for example in Eastern Europe and the Caribbean) and to presidential systems 
(most notably in Central and South America). I would be extremely interested to try to 
devise a more generalised study of bicameralism in parliamentary systems. And given my 
conclusion that an advantage of bicameralism in parliamentary systems is how it introduces 
an element of design akin to presidential legislatures, I would also like in future to consider 
to what extent bicameralism's merits translate into presidential systems. 
Finally, the essential element of perceived legitimacy, which I have given prominence in my 
conclusions, demands further consideration as this has been little studied. The topic is of 
particular relevance to the changing status of the still-unelected House of Lords. It will be of 
great interest to observe over the coming years whether the House of Lords manages to 
achieve growing levels of public support for its actions, and thus to increase its de facto 
powers. A comparative study of public support for second chambers, and a study of support 
for the House of Lords over time, would be useful to increasing our understanding of 
modem bicameralism. As Money and Tsebelis have suggested, 'efforts to analyze, explain 
and make more concrete the concept of legitimacy will enable future research to produce a 
more comprehensive understanding of bicameral legislatures' (1992: 40). 
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Personal Development 
This work has significantly enhanced my understanding, not only of bicameralism and 
parliaments in general, but also of the discipline of political science and the nature of 
academic research. 
My qualifications for being appointed to the initial project that started this work were 
twofold. First, I had a Masters degree in Political Economy and a background in research. 
Second, I had six years full-time experience of working in British politics, four of them spent 
working in the House of Commons and two of them for a political party. However, my first 
degree was in Mathematics and I had never formally studied either law or political science. I 
also had little knowledge of political systems overseas. 
I therefore began with a good grasp of political organisations and an understanding of 
research methods, but no familiarity with the various literatures into which this study must 
be located. It was thus a rapid learning process. At the outset I was motivated by the desire 
to publish practical recommendations for the UK in a readable and accessible format, and 
relatively sceptical about the utility of political theory. The research for the book (publication 
1) benefited from the general literature on bicameralism, and specific literatures with respect 
to the case study countries. However, it consciously did not take a principally theoretical 
approach, being largely based on empirical research. At a personal level the completion of 
this research was an extremely stimulating and fulfilling experience. It motivated me 
sufficiently in political science research to want to go on to generalise the lessons learnt from 
the case studies by returning to the original literature and seek to extend its conclusions. This 
was done gradually through the later work. This has enabled me to develop my thinking in a 
more abstract sense and extend my knowledge of the broader political science literature. It 
has also developed my communication skills in new and more academic directions. 
The process has thus been an education in political science (and to a lesser degree, 
constitutional law) which has been both fascinating and immensely rewarding. Having 
begun it five years ago as a thoughtful political hack and writer of practical briefings, I end it 
as someone established in her field, working on her second book, and valuing the various 
facets of both the discipline and the profession that she has entered. 
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Appendix: Summary of the Works 
1. Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas, Oxford University Press, 
January 2000, ISBN 0198298315. 
This is the main publication included in the package: a book of approximately 120,000 words. 
It was the result of an intensive year long programme of research involving both desk work 
and study trips, funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The book presents a detailed thematic 
study of the history, composition, powers and functions of second chambers in seven 
comparator countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain) and 
seeks to draw lessons for the future reform of the House of Lords. The book is organised in 
three parts. The first sets the context by giving a brief overview of the House of Lords and its 
reform and considering the history and current incidence of bicameralism worldwide. The 
second, and longest, part provides information on the case study countries, covering factors 
such as their method of composition, their membership in practice, relationship to 
government, functions in terms of legislative and committee work, constitutional and 
territorial roles, their administration, how they are viewed by the public and what attempts 
(if any) there have been at reform. The third part, organised in three chapters, seeks to draw 
lessons from these comparators for the reform of the House of Lords. It starts with general 
principles, moves on to potential functions of a reformed chamber and ends with lessons for 
its composition. The book closes with a short epilogue considering the prospects for future 
reform. 
2. 'Second Chambers Overseas', The Political Quarterly, vol. 70 no. 4, pp. 411-417, 
1999. 
This paper was published relatively early in the research and offers a brief and simple 
overview of the nature of second chambers worldwide, including their method of 
composition and their powers. It is an abbreviated version of a paper prepared for members 
of the Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords (established early in 1999) who 
employed the author as a consultant to advise on comparative lessons for reform. 
3. 'A ''More Democratic and Representative" Upper House?: Some International 
Comparisons', Representation, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 131.8, autumn 2000. 
This paper looks at the commitment in the government's 1997 manifesto to make the second 
chamber 'more democratic and representative' and considers how this might be done, in the 
light of international experience. The paper proposes that there are three key factors to 
consider to make a chamber effective: composition, powers/functions and legitimacy, and 
reviews these in tum. It notes that there are ways of designing a largely elected chamber 
which would complement the representative function of the House of Commons, whilst 
giving the chamber greater legitimacy. Published shortly after the report of the Royal 
Commission, the paper ends with a brief section on their findings and concludes that the 
Commission allowed itself to be overly constrained by its requirement to 'maintain the 
position of the House of Commons as the pre-eminent chamber of Parliament'. 
4. 'The Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords: A House for the Future?', 
Modern Law Review, vol. 64, no. 1, pp.82-99, January 2001 (with Richard Cornes). 
The report of the Royal Commission was published very shortly after the book and its 
contents were not known in advance. This paper, which is a critical review of the report in 
the light of experience in nine other countries, was therefore the first major opportunity to 
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apply some of the lessons drawn out in earlier work to official proposals made for reform in 
the UK. The paper goes through the main elements of the Royal Commission's report, and 
concludes that it was generally timid and did not take sufficient account of the UK's new 
constitutional settlement. It extends the argument in paper 3 with respect to the legitimacy 
and de facto powers of the reformed chamber, as well as looking at constitutional and 
territorial roles and other matters. (The paper includes a section on the judicial role of the 
House- of Lords drafted by Richard Comes, but was otherwise drafted by myself.) 
5. 'Upper House Reform in the UK and Australia', Australian Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 36 no. 1, March 2001, pp. 27-44. 
This paper, aimed primarily at an Australian audience, made a comparison of reform debates 
in just two countries, Australia and the UK. It gives an account of developments in the UK to 
date, up to and including the Royal Commission's report. It then goes on to contrast the 
treatment of different key issues in the two reform debates - including powers and the 
questi01t of 'mandate', legitimacy of the upper house, party balance and territorial roles. It 
outlines how in many ways both conceptions of how the upper house should operate, and its 
operation in practice, are coming together in the two countries - with both having moved to 
a situation where no party is in overall control of the chamber and consequently its de facto 
powers have been able to grow. 
6. 'What are Second Chambers for?', Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 54, no. 3, July 2001, 
pp. 442-458. 
Although published in a non-technical journal, this is one of the more abstract and general of 
the publications, seeking to consider the role of a second chamber in a modem democracy. 
Having had some time for reflection it allowed me to develop some of the ideas in the book 
further, drawing on some of the same case study countries but with a more general flavour. 
The paper gives a brief overview of previous analyses of the functions of second chambers, 
and goes on to identify fourfold contributions which second chambers may make: 
representing different interests to the first chamber, providing a political forum more 
independent of the executive, performing different parliamentary duties and acting as a veto 
player. The paper ends with a discussion about second chamber effectiveness. 
7. 'The Territorial Role of Second Chambers', Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 7, no. 
1, Spring 2001, pp. 105-118. 
This paper focuses on a particular function of second chambers, and investigates to what 
extent it is performed in practice in modem chambers. The paper proposes that the territorial 
roles that a second chamber can play may be broken into three categories: representing the 
territories at the national level, providing a forum for debate and agreement between them, 
and providing an institutional link between the national parliament and territorial 
assemblies or governments. Drawing on previous case studies and additional country 
information (notably on South Africa) the paper considers how much different chambers 
fulfil the territorial role. Expanding the arguments in chapter 10 of publication 1 it suggests 
that it is difficult for territoriality to be effectively designed in, and that it is important for 
second chamber representation to anticipate and respond to changes in territorial politics. 
8. 'Why are Second Chambers so Difficult to Reform?', Journal of Legislative Studies, 
vol. 8, no. 3, Autumn 2002, pp. 79-89 (with Mark Sandford). 
This is a short paper which offered the conclusion to a collection of articles on individual 
second chambers published in the Journal of Legislative Studies, and resulting from an 
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international seminar (org~ed by Mark Sandford) with speakers from Italy, Ireland, 
Canada and Australia. The purpose of the seminar was to look at an issue first explored in 
chapter 11 of the book - the extent to which second chambers are subject to calls for reform, 
which are largely unrealised. It sought to explore whether Britain can learn lessons about the 
reform process as well as its outcome, from overseas experience. The paper therefore looks at 
the history of reform attempts in these four countries and what common factors can explain 
how Significant dissatisfaction with second chambers can be coupled with relative inaction in 
terms of reform. The paper concludes that although reform in the UK context presents a 
significant challenge, many of the obstacles present in these other countries do not apply. 
9. 'Is the House of Lords Already Reformed?', Political Quarlerly, vol. 74, no. 2, July 
2003, pp. 311·318. 
This last paper was written shortly after the House of Commons had rejected all the 
proposed models for composition of the Lords put forward by the parliamentary joint 
committee set up for the purpose. It suggests that the argument - which concerned the 
proportion of members of the second chamber that should be elected - largely boiled down 
to a disagreement between supporters of consensus and majoritarian democracy. Those 
supporters of the majoritarian model feared that a large elected element in the upper house 
would give it sufficient legitimacy to threaten the primacy of the House of Commons. 
However, in an extension of the argument made in paper 5, I suggest that perceptions of the 
legitimacy of the semi-reformed chamber (now in place for more than three years) may be 
increasing even without the addition of elected members. The lack of enthusiasm shown by 
the Government for introducing elections to the chamber will, I suggest, ironically tend to 
boost this further. 
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